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Introduction
There is rhetoric to the effect that Islamic NGOs are 
in a better position to access victims of a conflict or 
of natural disasters in a Muslim country. However, 
events in Somalia contradict that rhetoric by 
demonstrating that religious identity alone does 
not determine the opening of the humanitarian 
space in a conflict-prone area. What matters is 
the political dialogue that the organization is able 
to establish with the factions that control the 
territory, combined with the NGO’s capacity to 
negotiate its presence in the field.
The following article provides a narrative of 
the 2006 and 2011 drought emergency responses 
in Somalia, showing how both Christian and 
Muslim organizations experienced difficulties in 
accessing the Somali population in need of urgent 
humanitarian assistance. Two examples are cited, 
which suggest the need to frame religious identity 
within a political discourse, where all NGOs, as 
political actors, need to find their strategies to 
negotiate access and be allowed to operate. 
Conceptualising humanitarian aid 
across religions and cultures
Humanitarian aid is motivated by a moral impulse 
to help other people in difficulty. As such, it is 
innate in human nature and has always existed. 
The European Union defines humanitarianism 
as the fundamental expression of the universal 
value of solidarity between people.1 Solidarity 
and human piety are also historically linked to 
religious traditions and sentiments, and this is 
why religion always played a role in providing aid 
to vulnerable populations. 
In modern times, humanitarian aid is typically 
provided in emergency situations to address the 
urgent basic needs of people at serious risk of 
losing their lives. Food, protection, water and 
medical assistance are traditionally provided in 
humanitarian aid to victims of natural disasters. 
Today however, after the end of the cold war 
and the emergence of the so-called “new wars,”2 
emergencies mostly have a political origin and are 
associated with conflicts at intra-state level. The 
notion of “complex political emergencies” was 
coined by the United Nations in 1991 to describe 
those situations characterized by complex crises 
that involve various actors. Military, state and 
civil actors may be involved simultaneously in a 
conflict that encompasses various geographical 
dimensions, from the local to the national or 
regional; there is often an absence of any State 
apparatus able to exercise governance and 
protect civilians. Civilians are the most affected in 
these so-called “new wars” as the conflicts in the 
Balkans in the early nineteen-nineties, in Somalia 
and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda demonstrate. 
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New wars, new conflicts and new emergencies 
require new tools to provide humanitarian aid. 
How does one operate in such a complex scenario? 
In response to this question, the international 
community was first inspired by the humanitarian 
principles set by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society; these 
principles of Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality 
and Independence3 were officially adopted in 
October 19654 and were elaborated on in 1994, 
through a Code of Conduct for the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster 
Relief. That Code of Conduct is a voluntary 
code seeking to set standards of behaviour 
of organizations and personnel involved in 
humanitarian aid. It is composed of ten principles, 
drawn largely by the humanitarian principles of 
the Red Cross Movement; these stress the need 
to ensure the right of each individual to receive 
humanitarian assistance, regardless of the race, 
creed or nationality of the recipients and without 
adverse distinctions of any kind. According to 
the Code, aid must not be used to further any 
particular political or religious standpoint and 
should not become an instrument of government 
foreign policy. Aid must respect culture and 
customs, and seek participation of the beneficiary 
community in the management of relief aid to 
reduce vulnerability to disasters and meeting 
basic needs.5 In the last twenty years, many other 
initiatives have followed to codify behaviours and 
standards of humanitarian assistance, to ensure 
quality and coordination,6 but the Code of Conduct 
remained the “father code” together with the 
idea that aid provision must be a right of every 
individual in need, while being impartial, neutral 
and independent.7
Muslim aid efforts are obviously part of the 
story of humanitarianism, although these received 
academic attention only recently.8 Islamic 
humanitarianism emerged as a phenomenon in 
Africa in the middle of the nineteen-seventies 
for various reasons. Firstly, there were political 
opportunities offered by the development of 
the Islamist movements from 1979 onwards9 
that used Islamic organizations to penetrate 
the civil society, also through humanitarian aid. 
Secondly, there were humanitarian needs and 
opportunities for Muslim actors to provide aid in 
many African countries, impoverished by the oil 
crises and deprived of social welfare programmes 
because of the austerity imposed by the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund through 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes. Finally, 
in the nineteen-eighties, funds became available 
to enable Muslim actors to operate, as a result of 
the new potentialities offered by the reform on 
the use of Zakat and Sadaqa Funds; these reforms 
allowed organizations, in addition to States, to 
manage religious donations, in respect of the 
Muslim principles outlined by the Prophet.10 
Muslim aid actors organized in NGOs during 
the nineteen-eighties in Africa, and the Islamic 
NGOs experienced a phase of exponential growth 
between 1980 and 2000.11 Islamic humanitarianism 
became visible to western aid actors from the 
mid nineteen-nineties, during the war in Bosnian 
Herzegovina. During the war, many organizations 
gathered under the Organization for Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC),12 provided assistance to 
refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs), 
also using the Fund for the Return of Bosnian 
Refugees. The Fund was established by the OIC 
to support agencies in addressing humanitarian 
needs of the victims of the ethnic cleansing; it also 
provided the Bosnian population with schools, 
hospitals and livelihood opportunities.13 In 2008, 
the OIC decided to institutionalize its activities 
in the humanitarian sector, creating an ad-hoc 
department within the OIC known as the Islamic 
Conference Humanitarian Affairs Department 
(ICHAD).14
The “rhetoric” of the faith-based 
organizations
Islamic humanitarianism and the role of Muslim 
organizations in providing aid and development 
services are gaining momentum after the need to 
expand humanitarian space to other actors that 
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can complement the UN-led humanitarian system. 
There is ample room for cooperation, provided that 
the two systems are compatible, based on the same 
principles and conversant with the same operative 
language. In other words, there is the need for 
mutual knowledge and understanding and this need 
is being covered by a large amount of literature and 
research on Islamic humanitarianism, practices and 
values. Islamic NGOs have been invited to provide 
their input on the humanitarian system during 
online consultations held in 2015 in preparation 
for the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 
May 2016. The online consultation titled Faith and 
Religion in Humanitarian Action highlights, among 
other issues, the need for faith-based organizations 
to become more actively included in international 
forums and coordination mechanisms. This 
would be in recognition of the valuable role that 
these organizations can play in humanitarian 
emergencies, especially in conflicts with strong and 
complex religious overtones. The report produced 
from those online consultations suggests that 
faith-based organizations can be better placed to 
understand the root causes of violence and to help 
by providing counselling and spiritual support. 
Also, faith-based organizations may have better 
access to affected people in situations of armed 
conflict, because of the networks of local religious 
infrastructures; also, they may be better at 
promoting peace and reconciliation among various 
conflicting religious groups.15 These arguments are 
frequent in the rhetoric of almost all the faith-based 
organizations that are engaged in development as 
well as humanitarian works. While recognizing the 
importance of faith-based organizations and their 
strong and direct linkage to local communities, 
this paper questions the current rhetoric in the 
light of the increasing politicization of the religious 
identity, especially in countries characterized by 
the presence of conflicting religious groups, such 
as Somalia.
Islamic and Christian organizations in 
Somalia
After the fall of the Siad Barre Regime in 1991, 
Islamic aid organizations16 proliferated in Somalia 
in response to humanitarian crises, and Islamic 
humanitarianism initiatives spread significantly. 
The Somali Islamist movement Al Islah, connected 
to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, devoted itself 
to expanding its membership base by being active 
in the sectors of humanitarian assistance and the 
social services. 
The Al Islah movement’s leadership invited 
many of its members, living in neighbouring Arab 
countries or in the West, to return to Somalia to 
head up Islamic aid organizations based in Gulf 
countries and affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
This was the case, for example, of the Africa 
Muslim Agency and Mercy-USA. Other Islamic aid 
organizations, not necessarily linked to Al Islah, 
also entered the country: these included the Saudi 
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), 
Crescent Welfare Society from the Arab Emirates, 
and the Kuwaiti Africa Relief Committee. Many 
Somalis from the diaspora gained positions of 
importance in the aid organizations of the host 
countries, above all Arab countries, and these 
positions proved to be strategically important 
when Al Islah asked its members to return to the 
country to contribute to Igathawa Tacliim, the 
humanitarian effort, one of the movement’s main 
strategic initiatives in the early nineteen-nineties. 
Other members of the movement contributed to 
Al Islah’s Igathawa Tacliim either by founding local 
aid organizations, such as the Zam Zam Foundation 
and Al Tadamun Social Society, or by working for 
them as directors of schools and hospitals. These 
aid organizations did not actually belong to the 
movement but were associated with it because 
its members served as directors. In this way, the 
Islamist movement Al Islah managed to put in 
place a series of structures furthering its strategic 
and programming aims while the movement kept 
a low profile in local society and in the eyes of the 
international community.17
The nineteen-nineties were also the years of a 
renewed presence of Christian aid organizations. 
The humanitarian needs facilitated the presence 
of Christian organizations such as Caritas 
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Switzerland, Catholic Relief Service and Swedish 
Church Relief, which were active in food and 
clothing distribution. The Adventist Development 
and Relief Agency conducted school support 
programmes while Norwegian Church Aid was 
active in the border region of Gedo.18 Other faith-
based organizations chose to downplay their 
religious identity; for example, Water for Life, a 
lay organization founded by a well-known Italian 
priest and active in the riverine area around 
Merca, and Diakonia, the social service agency of 
the German Protestant church. 
It is significant that the number of Christian 
organizations did not diminish because of the 
rise of Islamist radicalism in Somalia after 2006. 
Instead, new organizations arrived such as Finn 
Church Aid that, after starting in Northern Somalia 
and in Somaliland, later expanded into southern 
central zones.
Generally, the Christian aid organizations 
present in Somalia do not have a religious 
movement working alongside them overseeing 
questions connected with humanitarian access 
to the territory in conflict situations; this is 
unlike the numerous Islamic organizations. 
Each organization has developed its own access 
strategy, relying above all on a local support 
network built up over the years. Some of these 
strategies include constructing a kind of clan-
based affiliation, which ensures protection for 
the members of the organization; others rely on 
local partners of a different religious confession; 
for example, Norwegian Church Aid in the Gedo 
region has developed partnerships with Islamic 
ONGs which execute their projects.19
In the last two decades and more, both Christian 
and Islamic organizations encountered increasing 
levels of difficulty when trying to operate in 
Somalia; this became a difficult environment 
where the space for humanitarian efforts 
continued to shrink because of the emergence 
of political economy of aid and conflict.20The 
need to expand that space for humanitarian 
work in Somalia calls for a deeper reflection on 
the potential role of faith-based organizations in 
gaining more access to areas controlled by radical 
Islamist movements. 
The following two narratives on the 2006 and 
2011 drought emergency responses and purposely 
offer elements of reflection on the relative 
importance of the faith-based identity to access 
the victims of a conflict or a natural disaster. 
The drought emergency response 
“at risk” in 2006
In Somalia, livestock trade accounts for a big 
share of household income.21 The good health 
and condition of goats, cattle and camels in 
Somalia depends on the recurrent rains that are 
distinguished according to the seasons: there are 
the short rains Deyr, from October to November, 
and the long rains from March to June (Gu). In 
late 2005, both the Deyr and the Gu failed, leading 
to the drying up of water sources by March 2016; 
this resulted in a large number of livestock deaths 
and widespread crop failure, especially in the 
southern regions. In early 2006, livestock prices 
dropped considerably while food prices increased 
and the purchasing power of most families in 
the South was eroded significantly.22 There were 
large movements of population and livestock 
within Somalia and across the border to Kenya 
and Ethiopia, in search of food, water and pasture. 
The United Nations estimated that more than two 
million people were in need of urgent aid,23 and 
the humanitarian response was organized in line 
with the newly launched (2005) humanitarian 
reform.
The year 2006 was also a period of profound 
political changes in Somalia; early that year, the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emerged as a new 
political actor in Central Southern Somalia.24After 
being forced to take a political stand against the 
US-backed warlords Alliance for Restoration of 
Peace and Counter Terrorism, the Islamic Courts 
Union managed to overrun much of Mogadishu 
city in less than one month. By June 2006, the 
ICU had complete control over Mogadishu. Their 
declared aim was to bring an alternative means of 
governance to the factional politics based on clan 
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loyalty, using the Sharia Law as an equalitarian 
tool for imposing rules and order.
When a severe drought hit the country, causing 
one of the most acute humanitarian emergencies 
experienced in the past ten years, most of Southern 
Somalia was dominated by the three main Islamist 
groups that together formed the ICU. Many Islamic 
aid organizations, in all probability ideologically 
linked to the underground Islamist movement Al 
Islah, mobilized resources to address the onset 
of that emergency and to provide immediate 
support to the victims with palm dates to eat and 
shelter.25
The Islamic Courts Union, however, regarded 
Al Islah as a potential political opponent and 
banned its organizations from operating in the 
areas under ICU’s control. The ban affected all 
the organizations that at the time were part of 
the three networks of civil society organizations 
promoted by Al Islah: the Peace and Human Rights 
Network (PHRN), the Coalition of Grassroots 
Women’s Organizations, and the Formal Private 
Education Network in Somalia (FPENS). A total 
of approximately 140 local organizations were 
affected.26
This persecution of Al Islah and the fact that 
it was impossible for its own organizations to 
operate in the south of the country ruled by the 
Islamic Courts Union, gave rise to numerous 
diplomatic attempts on the part of the movement 
to modify its status of persona non grata. The aim 
was to regain the option to operate in Somalia with 
all its structures and organizations. Al Islah opted 
to publish a communiqué27 containing a political 
message in support of the ICU, even though ICU 
military intervention aimed to override the Somali 
Transition Government, of which Al Islah was then 
an ally. Following this communiqué, the Islamic 
Courts Union received the representatives of the 
organizations of the civil society in Mogadishu 
to sanction a general collaboration. The meeting 
restored the organizations of civil society and 
NGOs affiliated to Al Islah. The outcome was that 
they were allowed to continue their activities in 
Somalia, including conferences, meetings and 
public debates in the cause of peace and stability.
Al Islah’s communiqué was probably mere 
political manoeuvring. However, it made possible 
a dialogue with the Islamic Courts Union aimed 
at negotiating access for the humanitarian 
organizations linked to Al Islah on the territory 
controlled by the ICU. 
Any narrative describing the 2006 drought 
emergency response in Somalia should record 
that religious identity did, in practice, hinder the 
capacity of Islamic organizations to access the 
displaced population in Somalia. The split between 
the different factions of Islamist movements 
turned the faith-based identity into a political 
factor that needed to be resolved with political 
measures.
The famine emergency response 
in 2011
A situation similar to the 2006 drought occurred 
again in 2011, when another rainy season with 
rainfall below normal caused the health and 
condition of livestock to fail. As a result, marked 
prices of slaughtered livestock fell markedly, 
with milk production declining significantly 
for most households in Somalia. This crisis 
was exacerbated by a systematic failure of 
contingency planning by humanitarian agencies, 
to deal with the food shortage which had already 
begun in late 2010. In 2011, the drought caused 
Africa’s worst food security crisis in Somalia 
since the 1991-1992 famine, to the extent that 
almost half of the entire Somali population was 
affected.28 According to analysts, the impact of 
the drought was exacerbated by multiple factors 
that included conflict, the use of anti-terrorism 
legislation by the US government to prevent aid 
reaching Southern Somalia, an increase in global 
food prices, and other structural factors such as 
the limited access to the victims of the natural 
disaster located in areas controlled by the radical 
Islamist organization Al Shabab.29 In fact, Al 
Shabab’s power in Somalia started to decline in 
2011 because of the jihadists’ loss of support from 
Al Qaida.30 As a result, the Islamist group made 
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its positions in the country more rigid, denying 
access to the international aid community during 
one of the worst famines in Somalia in the last 
two decades.31 The areas in need of humanitarian 
assistance included the Bay and Lower Shebelle 
regions, parts of the Middle Shebelle and Bakool 
regions, the internally displaced people (IDP) 
camps in the Afgoi Corridor and also the IDP 
camps in Mogadishu. By claiming that aid workers 
were spies of Western intelligence agencies,32 Al 
Shabab banned most organizations from accessing 
the humanitarian crises. The list of organizations 
banned from carrying out humanitarian missions 
was very varied and included UN organizations 
and lay ONGs (Danish Refugee Council, Norwegian 
Refugee Council, Coopi), Christian aid agencies such 
as the Norwegian Church Aid and also local Islamic 
organizations such as Saacid.33 In contrast, some 
operational agencies that operated largely outside 
of the UN-led cluster system such as Médecins 
sans Frontières, Somalia Red Crescent Society 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
continued to enjoy access in areas administered 
by Al Shabaab, albeit with certain restrictions, 
before and during the famine.34 As noted by some 
analysts, while banning some organizations, Al 
Shabaab permitted others to work35 and this was 
due to the negotiating capacities of some of the 
organizations that were successful in obtaining 
access to areas controlled by Al Shabaab. 
A study was conducted by the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) on the role of the 
Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 
coordinating Islamic aid during the 2011 famine 
in Somalia.36 The study concluded that while the 
OIC played an important coordination role, it did 
not itself negotiate access to areas controlled by 
Al Shabaab in Somalia, leaving this task to the 
individual organizations within the OIC Coalition. 
The key factor in securing access was, according 
to the ODI, the network and reputation of 
individual Islamic organizations. This conclusion 
agrees with the thesis proposed by the current 
analysis: thus, humanitarian diplomacy rather 
than religious identity defines the boundaries of 
the humanitarian space. 
In the complex political scenario prevailing in 
Somalia, faith identity alone, whether Christian or 
Islamic, did not have the power to facilitate access 
to humanitarian space. Rather, in 2011 the ban 
was the outcome of an obstructionist policy by Al 
Shabaab against all the actors who in one way or 
another had relations with the UN-backed Somali 
Transitional Federal Government,37 whether 
Christian, lay or Muslim.
Conclusion
This review of the two emergency responses 
to the droughts in Somalia, in 2006 and in 2011, 
suggests that religious identity alone is not 
enough to guarantee humanitarian access to 
zones under the control of a specific religious 
group which in these two emergency responses 
was Islamist. Indeed, at times, religious identity 
can actually be a hindrance, as in the case of the 
Islamic aid organizations linked to the Al Islah 
movement. Instead, face-to-face diplomacy and 
political dialogue between individual agencies and 
conflicting parties are powerful tools for opening 
humanitarian access to aid agencies in conflict-
induced emergencies.
Regardless of whether they are Christian, lay 
or Muslim, all aid organizations need to negotiate 
access in conflict areas controlled by religious 
groups or by other kind of militia. Humanitarian 
actors should recognize that they need to engage 
in dialogue, even with extremist groups and that 
such dialogue needs to take place in an open and 
coordinated manner. This process would open the 
humanitarian space more efficiently than simply 
relying on the rhetoric of the religious identity of 
some aid organizations.
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